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Abstract
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), has long been a puzzle, both in its doctrinal structure and
in long, strange dicta which are both triumphal and elegiac. In this Essay, I
show that the opinion becomes newly intelligible when read in the context of
the law and theory of colonialism, concerned, like the case itself, with the expropriation of continents and relations between dominant and subject peoples.
I examine several instances where the seeming incoherence of the opinion
instead shows its debt to imperial jurisprudence, which rested on a distinction
between two bodies of law: one governing relations among “civilized” nations,
the other relations between “civilized” governments and the “imperfect sovereigns” of other nations. I then show how Marshall’s long dicta reflect the
then-prevalent view of the historical progress of societies from hunter-gatherer
to commercial orders, with each stage corresponding to a particular set of
property institutions. This historical theory lent intelligibility to the legal distinctions between “civilized” and “lesser” or “imperfect” sovereigns by claiming that the latter occupied earlier stages of development and that “civilized”
nations were legally permitted to override the property institutions of “primitive” societies in order to induce progress. The dicta, then, provide the frame
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for the reasoning of the case, just as the theory of historical progress framed
the jurisprudence of colonialism in general.
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Introduction
Johnson v. M’Intosh1 is among the seminal cases in American
property law.2 It is also one of the stranger opinions in American jurisprudence. In the course of ruling that purchasers of land from Native American tribes did not acquire title enforceable in the courts of
the United States,3 Chief Justice Marshall is elegiac, triumphal, and
recurrently ambivalent toward his own reasoning. Marshall acknowledged that the principle of his holding “may be opposed to natural
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 3–19 (5th ed. 2002) (opening
discussion of property law with Johnson); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 69–75 (1998) (beginning discussion
of the legal institutions that frame property practices with Johnson); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 3–15 (3d ed. 2002) (opening discussion of
property law with Johnson).
3 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572 (“The inquiry . . . is, in a great measure, confined to
the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained
in the Courts of this country.”); id. at 587–88 (holding that the unquestioned power of the
United States government to convey Indian lands to settlers “must negative the existence of any
right which may conflict with, and control it,” to wit, a right in Indians to convey enforceable
title).
1
2
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right, and to the usages of civilized nations,”4 but, in one of those moments of judicial candor that might convince a vulgar Legal Realist to
declare (Pyrrhic) victory and go home, declared that “[c]onquest gives
a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.”5 He also spun
a narrative tapestry of dicta, describing an agentless ethnic cleansing
in which Native Americans “necessarily receded,” along with the deer
and the unbroken forests, before the axe and plough of the American
frontier.6 By the end of the opinion, the Euro-American expropriation of North America has emerged as (1) lawful and (2) inevitable,
even though the basis of its legality was “opposed to natural right”
and Marshall stressed that the inevitability of the displacement gave
“excuse” but not “justification” to expulsion.7
What is the relationship between the relentless march forward of
the legal judgment and the ambivalent tone and sometimes paradoxical movements of the discussions of historical necessity and natural
right? The key to the strangeness of the opinion is that Johnson v.
M’Intosh is not just a property case; it is also the leading American
case in the law of imperialism. By designating Johnson in this way, I
mean that it concerns the competing claims of representatives of two
political societies, one dominant, the other subordinate, within an extended system of such domination.8 The courts of the dominant society enjoy unchallenged jurisdiction over the issue in consequence of
the imperial relationship. Therefore, the question of the case is not
which political society will prevail, but what concessions the dominant
society will make to the subordinate one. This type of relationship
between political societies formed the pattern of imperial rule
throughout the Euro-American Age of Empire, from the Spanish conquest of the Americas in the fifteenth century to the independence of
India and Europe’s African colonies after World War II.9 It generated
Id. at 591.
Id. at 588.
6 Id. at 590–91.
7 Id. at 589.
8 For a concise account of the modes and varieties of imperialism, see generally
ANTHONY PAGDEN, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES (2001) (describing the history of imperial institutions and ideas).
9 See generally ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE
IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C. 1500 – C. 1800 (1995) (discussing the normative theory of
European empire from the discovery and colonization of America to the defeat of royalist armies in South America in the 1830s). An important recent study of the jurisprudence of imperialism, with particular attention to concepts of sovereignty that become important later in this
Essay, is EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (2002). On conflicts in English liberalism with regard to the legiti4
5
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its own jurisprudence and its own problems in normative reasoning,
which deeply shaped, and thus help to explain, Marshall’s reasoning
and tone in Johnson.
Imperial thought has enjoyed a certain vogue in the last five
years, after several decades of overwhelming disrepute.10 That period
of disrepute was as polemical as the recent reconsideration has often
been.11 It typically involved condemning centuries of European
thought and politics as relentlessly pro-imperialist, and went so far as
to suggest that liberal conceptions of rights and theories of progress,
and even philosophical and legal ideas of rationality, ineluctably produced imperial rule and rapine.12
More interesting than either the all-encompassing attack on empire or the credulous revival of imperial conceits is the recognition
among a new generation of historians and political theorists that centuries of empire, which coincided with extraordinary developments in
European law, politics, philosophy, economics, and literature, produced complex and multifarious thinking.13 In particular, the jurisprudential, political, and philosophical developments of the imperial
period did not have any simple or straightforward relationship to emmacy of empire, a major advance was UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999) (arguing for a relationship between liberal universalism and normative self-confidence about empire). A particularly nuanced
recent study, demonstrating the subtle and multifarious variation in liberal attitudes toward empire, is JENNIFER PITTS, A TURN TO EMPIRE: THE RISE OF IMPERIAL LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN
AND FRANCE (2005).
10 See, e.g., MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2002); NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH
WORLD ORDER AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2003) (discussing normative claims
about imperialism in the context of the rise and fall of the British Empire); LAWRENCE F.
KAPLAN & WILLIAM KRISTOL, THE WAR OVER IRAQ: SADDAM’S TYRANNY AND AMERICA’S
MISSION (2003) (discussing modern American foreign policy in Iraq and “exporting democracy”). I reconstruct and evaluate arguments of this sort in Jedediah Purdy, Liberal Empire:
Assessing the Arguments, ETHICS & INT’L AFF., Fall 2003, at 35.
11 See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) (characterizing imperialism as a categorically pernicious episode that shaped the self-understanding of the West as well as its attitude
toward the rest of the world); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1994) (updating
the author’s earlier assessments of the historical and modern impact of imperialism); GAYATRI
CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, SELECTED WORKS OF GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK (Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean eds., 1996).
12 A much more popular version of these themes, updated for the era of September 11 and
the Iraq War, is ARUNDHATI ROY, AN ORDINARY PERSON’S GUIDE TO EMPIRE (2004). But see
PITTS, supra note 9, at 3–5 (noting and preparing to argue against this reductive attitude).
13 See MEHTA, supra note 9, at 77–114; PITTS, supra note 9, at 3–5. Although an explicit
argument about complexity and multifariousness is not the concern of Edward Keene, it emerges
in his discussion of imperial jurisprudence. See KEENE, supra note 9, at 97–119.
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pire.14 They neither produced it nor arose to justify it, but they did
not straightforwardly condemn or contradict it, either.15 Instead, ideas
about progress, rights, and the rule of law interacted with imperial
practice in many different ways. Great liberal reformers such as John
Stuart Mill and his father, James Mill, were enthusiastic partisans of
British “despotism” in India.16 The moderate and humane conservative Alexis de Tocqueville strongly supported French rule over Algeria.17 But Adam Smith, the jurist, economist, and philosopher of
commercial society, resisted supporting imperial projects,18 while the
radical legal reformer and founder of utilitarianism (and muse to the
Mills), Jeremy Bentham, denounced them.19 The conservative Edmund Burke was the greatest British enemy of imperial abuses in the
second half of the eighteenth century.20 The arch-liberal philosophe
Denis Diderot could claim the same honor in contemporary France.21
This clutch of examples, many of which I will return to, is enough to
suggest the complexity of the phenomenon and the various and non14

See MEHTA, supra note 9, at 77–114; PITTS, supra note 9, at 3–5.

15

See MEHTA, supra note 9, at 77–114; PITTS, supra note 9, at 3–5.

See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 415–16
(Geraint Williams ed., J.M. Dent 1993) (1861) [hereinafter MILL, CONSIDERATIONS] (“[T]here
are [peoples] which . . . must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for
that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as any other if it is the one which in
the existing state of civilisation of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher
stage of improvement. There are . . . conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in
itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to
render them capable of a higher civilisation. . . . The ruling country ought to be able to do for its
subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs . . . .”); JAMES MILL, THE
HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA (William Thomas ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1975) (1820) [hereinafter
MILL, HISTORY] (evincing staggering disdain throughout for a Hindu civilization which Mill regards as barbaric and in need of thoroughgoing reconstruction); see also MEHTA, supra note 9, at
87–114; PITTS, supra note 9, at 123–62 (discussing the Mills’ influence on the development of
imperial liberalism in Britain).
16

17

PITTS, supra note 9, at 204–39 (discussing Tocqueville and Algeria).

18

See id. at 25–58 (discussing Smith’s theory of history and attitude toward colonialism).

19

See id. at 103–22 (discussing Bentham’s view of British imperial power).

Burke’s attitudes are demonstrated by his long campaign against British rule in India.
See id. at 59–100 (arguing that Burke’s combination of universalism as to essential humanitarian
principles and pluralism as to the content of particular cultures lent suppleness and restraint to
his cultural and moral judgment); see also MEHTA, supra note 9, at 153–89 (making a similar
argument).
20

21 Diderot wrote in favor of the right of colonized people to resist colonial expropriation,
and decried colonization of the Americas as the event that had restored the place of slavery in
the modern economy after its long decline in Western Europe. See DENIS DIDEROT, Histoire des
Deux Indes, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 169, 175–77 (John Hope Mason & Robert Wokler trans. &
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1772–1780) (the right of resistance); id. at 185–88 (colonization and slavery).
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obvious relationships between general ideas and attitudes toward
empire.
Yet none of this is to say that the legal and intellectual history of
imperialism is merely, in William James’s phrase, a blooming, buzzing
confusion. There is a consistent logic in the questions or problems
that imperial law posed. In deciding the status of claims by subject
peoples within the legal system of the dominant society, jurists and
theorists had to develop an account of the relationship between the
legal systems and underlying normative cultures of the two societies.22
Were they symmetrical, so that the role of the dominant society’s
courts, or of normative reasoning generally in the dominant society,
was to adjudicate between competing claims and interests in the manner of modern choice-of-law reasoning?23 Was the subordinate society
regarded as inferior, not just in power but in the quality of its normative claims, so that such claims had no purchase on the reasoning of
the dominant society, but were instead to be regarded as symptoms of
backwardness suited for management and correction?24 Or was the
subordinate society’s normative order eligible for legal recognition in
some respects, but in others set aside as a mark of underdevelopment,
so that the interpreter’s task was to distinguish between the eligible
and the ineligible?
Choosing among these alternatives necessarily involved representatives of the dominant society in cultural interpretation of both
their own society and the subordinate one. Should they envision the
subordinate society as a more primitive version of their own, a living
specimen of the past awaiting a future already prefigured in the dominant society?25 Should they understand it is as genuinely different, not
just a distinct link on a single chain of historical progress, but nonetheless as inferior according to some normative metric that applies to
both (or all) societies?26 Or should they treat the two societies as in
22 Throughout this Essay, I deal both with legal reasoning, especially concerning relationships among types of sovereigns, and with the political, historical, and theoretical self-conceptions that accompanied and often lent sense to these. Consequently, I sometimes use this broad
but infelicitous pairing of terms to convey my meaning.
23 For a discussion of the conception of sovereignty and culture that supports this sort of
view, see KEENE, supra note 9, at 135–50 (discussing an egalitarian conception of states and a
nonhierarchical conception of cultures).
24 This view, for instance, was a consequence of the Mills’ view of civilization and sovereignty. See supra note 16.
25 I discuss the relationship between this conception of civilization and history, on the one
hand, and relations among sovereigns, on the other, with particular reference to the historical
accounts of Adam Smith and William Blackstone, in Part III.A, infra.
26 To appreciate this idea, consider the American conception of the Soviet Union during
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some real sense incommensurable, embodying irreducibly distinct
combinations of familiar values and even, perhaps, altogether different values?27 These divergent ideas, in turn, presuppose beliefs about
the nature of history and the degree to which human societies are
bound by universal commonalities or, alternatively, are truly unlike
one another.28 While such cultural interpretation does not have direct
and necessary implications for legal and political judgments, history
and reflection suggest affinities between the two modes of judgment:
versions of the one tend to keep company with versions of the other.29
Two tendencies persisted in the cultural interpretations that
members of dominant societies made of subordinate ones throughout
the Age of Empire. Broadly speaking, one was ironic, attentive to
paradox, inconsistency, and disjuncture. The other was irenic, pressing toward coherence and conciliation of divergent cultures into a single view of the world. Ironists tended to see imperial enterprises as
revealing the fatuity and dangerousness of any stark opposition between “civilized” Europeans and “savage” or “barbaric” others.30 On
the one hand, the bare fact of cultural encounter for them highlighted
the diversity of human existence and experience, unsettling the easy
supposition that their own societies were natural or inevitable.31 On
the other hand, European atrocities in winning and governing empires
the Cold War: neither as a primitive precursor to modern liberty, nor as a truly distinct civilization with its own code of values; rather as another modern society, one that failed by the relevant
modern values of personal freedom and social prosperity. Such a view of China or the Ottoman
Empire, for instance, was widespread in early Modern Europe.
27 For a genuinely pluralist discussion of civilizations, see JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF
LIBERALISM 34–68 (2000) (arguing for a conception of values as genuinely pluralist, articulated
in different, incompatible, and mutually irreducible ways in different civilizations).
28 The relationship is not perfect, of course. As Jennifer Pitts points out, Adam Smith’s
broadly universalist theory of history did not lead him to a reductive or patronizing account of
non-European societies as primitive little siblings, partly because both his theory of judgment
and his account of the history of Europe emphasized flexibility, context, and contingency, rather
than consistent and ineluctable principles. See PITTS, supra note 9, at 43–52 (discussing Smith’s
moral philosophy with regard to cross-cultural judgments).
29 Pitts’s account of the loose relationship between theoretical method and imperial politics, see id., is somewhat more persuasive than Uday Mehta’s suggestion that the very fact of a
universal theory of history and progress tends to generate imperial commitments, see MEHTA,
supra note 9, at 23–45 (suggesting so, although with subtle caveats and qualifications characteristic of Mehta’s probing thought).
30 This is roughly Pitts’s characterization of Smith. See PITTS, supra note 9, at 25–58. In
some ways, its exemplar is Michel de Montaigne. See MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Cannibals, in
THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 150, 150–59 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 1957) (1578–1580) (arguing that the supposed barbarism of subordinate societies is not so
far removed from familiar domestic practices, and that much that Montaigne’s fellow Europeans
took for granted about their own lives could be plausibly redescribed as barbaric).
31 See DE MONTAIGNE, supra note 30, at 150–59; DIDEROT, supra note 21, at 169–97.
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laid low the idea of European moral superiority: if missionaries and
colonial governors were looking for savages and barbarians to improve, suggested Montaigne, Diderot, and (sometimes) Jeremy Bentham, they might begin at home.32
By contrast, irenists tended to see cultural encounter as confirming the unity of human experience. Across places and times, human
beings pursued the same aims and were answerable to the same moral
rules.33 Differences between societies were a reflection of their different positions along a single continuum of development, from savagery
to civilization, or their different degrees of distance from the cultural
and spiritual grace of European Christians.34 Irenists thus tended to
see imperial missions as expressions, even duties, of superiority within
a coherent human order, to the point of portraying empire as philanthropic self-sacrifice.35
Irony and irenism ran together in early American attitudes, partly
because of ambivalence as to whether Americans were colonizers or a
colonized people. On the one hand, Americans formed a settler colony, systematically displacing an indigenous population.36 Their complaints against Great Britain prominently included the Crown’s
constraints on their westward expansion.37 As late as the War of 1812,
British victory portended a buffer nation of Native Americans on the
new country’s northwest flank—in the same territory where American
32 See DIDEROT, supra note 21, at 169–97; MONTAIGNE, supra note 30. For a discussion of
Bentham’s mistrust of the moral arrogance of imperialism, see PITTS, supra note 9, at 103–07.
33 See supra note 16 (referencing the thought of the Mills).
34 See supra note 16.
35 Pitts points out that both James Mill and John Stuart Mill were at pains to establish that
British rule in India was a net loss for Great Britain, and thus was properly regarded as a charitable, humanitarian project. See PITTS, supra note 9, at 16.
36 Indeed, the defendants in Johnson, arguing against Native American title, marshaled a
set of arguments that had been designed precisely to justify colonial expropriation, specifically
the accounts of property and sovereignty developed by Grotius, Locke, and Vattel. See Johnson
v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567–71 (1823). On the origins and contemporary uses of
this line of argument, which rested on the claim that government originated in private property
and thus full sovereignty could not exist in nations that lacked private property—meaning that
other property by definition could not be legally symmetrical with European-style regimes—see
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 102–08 (1999) (Grotius); id. at 166–96 (tracing development of this theory from Locke through Vattel); JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137–76 (1993) (describing the use of Lockean thought to
abridge aboriginal land claims).
37 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 9, 29 (U.S. 1776) (complaining
that King George “has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose . . . raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands” and “has endeavoured to bring
on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages”).
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writ was contested in Johnson.38 Although they insisted on white,
Protestant, settler hegemony over the continent, in face of a British
willingness to govern a multicultural empire of commerce, the Americans in these respects were imperialists par excellence.39
On the other hand, the American Revolution was a colonists’ revolt against the arrogance of the world’s leading imperial power, and
there was considerable impulse to regard the United States not as an
extension to perfection of British settler enterprises, but as something
new in the world. Alexander Hamilton, no fire-breathing radical but
very much a nationalist, proposed as much in The Federalist No. 11,
where he aligned America with Europe’s once prone and now resurgent victims. “Unhappily,” he wrote, “Europe, . . . by force and by
fraud, has, in different degrees extended her dominion over them all.
Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination.”40
He continued,
The superiority [Europe] has so long maintained, has
tempted her to plume herself as the mistress of the world,
and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers, have, in direct
terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority;
and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the
human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs
cease to bark, after having breathed a while in our atmosphere. Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European; it belongs to us to vindicate the honor
of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother
moderation.41
This remarkable passage aligns the nascent United States with the
victims of imperialism and offers the country as a champion of the
world’s downtrodden humanity. Hamilton also displays some of the
ironic sensibility of the great critics of empire, such as Diderot and
Montaigne, in his wry evocation of the absurdity of overweening imperial self-confidence. An imperial nation whose arrogance produces
such preposterous empirical mistakes as belief in the unbarking
38 See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 153
(2005) (commenting on the alliance of interest in the War of 1812 between the British defense of
Canada and the Native American checking of American westward expansion); id. at 160–61
(noting the British plan to hand over Michigan territory to Native American allies upon defeating American forces).
39
40
41

See id. at 151, 163.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
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American dog is not so formidable a foe as it may imagine itself, nor
can it overawe the American who has seen through its pose.42 Seeing
through the moral and theoretical poses of power is the consummate
achievement of the ironic posture toward empire.
Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to the interlinked problems of
cultural and legal interpretation is a hybrid, occupying an uneasy middle ground between Hamilton’s disdain for European imperial arrogance and the emerging political reality that the United States had
become the successor to the European imperial powers.43 As will
emerge in the discussion of Marshall’s legal reasoning, he interpreted
the legal position of the United States as continuous with that of the
European colonizers.44 His language, however, frequently indicates
an ironic distaste for imperial presumptuousness, a mockery of the
moral self-confidence of imperial apologists.45 Nonetheless, his reasoning in the end presupposes the irenic view of culture and history
that underlies the law of imperialism.46 Marshall was therefore an
ironic irenist, heir to a political tradition of anti-imperial sentiments
and a legal tradition of pro-imperial apologetics, which brings in train
a hierarchical view of culture and history. These paradoxes lend their
shape to the fault lines of a decision that is entirely decisive in content,
yet strained and self-questioning in tone.
In Part I of this Essay, I begin my exposition by examining two
doctrinal puzzles in the reasoning of Johnson: Chief Justice Marshall’s
summary rejection of an argument based on colonial property law in
India, and his refusal to apply customary law requiring conquerors to
respect the existing property arrangements of conquered peoples. I
also address a third puzzle: the ironic and self-questioning tone of the
opinion. My interpretation of the case takes its initial strength from
its power to elucidate these puzzles. In Part II, I connect this account
with recent scholarship on the history of international law, which has
pointed out a critical legal distinction between two classes of political
societies: full and imperfect sovereigns. The powers of imperfect sov42 It was an essential part of Montaigne’s irony that understanding the frailty and foolishness of the powerful and the common, flawed humanity of all was a check against the conceits of
power. In this respect, his irony served to unsettle self-confidence with the aim of diminishing
the motives of unreflective action. See MONTAIGNE, supra note 30, at 150–59.
43 On the importance of the War of 1812 in consolidating an American political culture
committed to westward expansion and to the interests of settlers, see WILENTZ, supra note 38, at
175–78.
44 See infra Parts I.A, I.B.
45 See infra Part I.B.
46 See infra Part III.
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ereigns might be overridden or supplanted by the acts of full sovereigns to the extent that the imperfect sovereigns were unwilling or
unable to secure and promote certain essential human interests, which
were conceived through a theory of progress. In Part III, I explain the
essential role of property regimes in structuring the legal theory of
colonialism. The theory depended on a historical account of how imperial institutions worked to promote and secure progress. Property
was the lodestone institution in diagnosing the stage of progress a society occupied. This diagnosis, in theory, enabled the full sovereign to
direct the subordinate society toward higher stages. In Part IV, I return to Johnson v. M’Intosh in light of this analysis.
It is worth saying up front that in the following exposition I present arguments based on alleged hierarchies among cultures and peoples with deliberate credulity. I am interested in reconstructing these
arguments as faithfully as possible and understanding how they structured ideas about the legitimacy of colonialism and the role of property regimes in civilizational progress. I have decided not to insert
constant signals of my skepticism or hostility toward certain premises
and implications of the view I am treating, for fear that such constant
disowning can become a rhetorical tic and impediment to clear writing. I trust readers will not mistake me for an apologist for the ethnocentric, often crudely teleological, and implicitly or explicitly racist
dimensions of the body of thought whose shape and significance I am
trying to understand.
I. Two Puzzles and Some Irony
Johnson v. M’Intosh has received considerable scholarly scrutiny,
none of it entirely satisfactory. On one view, Johnson is an acquiescence to power, in which the courts and the law of property serve as
instruments of colonial expropriation. From this perspective, the case
teaches the general lesson that law serves power, and some specific
lessons about the terms on which that service has been provided in the
law of property and Native American rights.47 On a second view,
47 Joseph Singer thus treats the Supreme Court’s tribal property jurisprudence as evidence
that “both property rights and political power in the United States are associated with a system
of racial caste” and that “property rights in land cannot, for the most part, be traced to a system
of individual merit and reward,” but rather reflect the use of state power on behalf of favored
groups. See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991).
Singer proceeds to argue that Johnson proves that
[t]he historical basis of original acquisition of property in the United States is not
individual possession in the state of nature, with government stepping in only to
protect property rights justly acquired. Rather, it is redistribution by the govern-
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Johnson is an uncomfortable—indeed, an untenably fraught—shotgun
marriage of law and power, the latter crystallized in colonial expropriation and ethnic cleansing.48 A third approach to the case treats it
very much as law, specifically an application of the customary law of
relations between European colonial governments and Native American tribes in the first two-plus centuries of North American
colonization.49
ment from those who were thought not to need the property or to be misusing it to
those who were thought to need it . . . .
Id. at 51; see also Liam Séamus O’Melinn, The Imperial Origins of Federal Indian Law: The
Ideology of Colonization in Britain, Ireland, and America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1207, 1270 (1999)
(terming the “principles” of Johnson “the intellectual product of a centuries-old vision . . . . [of] a
simple native, thought to be in need of imperial instruction, and possessed of valuable commodities to exchange for the blessings of civilization”).
48 Philip Frickey has argued that “Johnson seemed to establish a rigid dichotomy between
power and law. Colonialism, Johnson seemed to say, raises almost exclusively nonjusticiable,
normative questions beyond judicial authority.” Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
381, 389 (1993). These questions are among those Chief Justice Marshall classed with “natural
right [and] the usages of civilized nations.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591–92
(1823). On Frickey’s reading of the opinion, “[c]olonialism was . . . prior to, and the antithesis of,
constitutionalism, which involves justiciable, legal questions about judicially enforceable limits
on governmental action.” Frickey, supra, at 389. Frickey’s view that Johnson established “a rigid
dichotomy” appears to reflect not only Marshall’s seeming refusal to give legal effect to “natural
right [and] the usages of civilized nations,” but also a supposition that if the law endorses colonialism, it must in that measure be lawless. As he puts it,

[i]n a country that prides itself on following the rule of law, the justifications for
colonization uttered by those European explorers and recognized by the Supreme
Court itself—to impose Christianity upon the heathen, to make more productive
use of natural resources, and so on—do not go down easily in the late-twentieth
century.
Id. at 383. Frickey proceeds to argue that in later decisions concerning the relationship of Native
American tribes to the United States government, Marshall developed the basic terms of a body
of federal Indian law that mediated between constitutionalism and colonialism in much more
supple and less quiescent ways than he sees Johnson as doing. Id. at 384–85, 390–406.
49 The exemplar of this approach is Eric Kades, who treats Johnson as an exercise in doctrinal reasoning, albeit doctrine for which much of the relevant precedent is the practice of sovereigns. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 LAW
& HIST. REV. 67, 69 (2001) (“Marshall appealed to custom—the longstanding European and
American practice of barring private purchases of Indian land—to provide the rule of decision in
Johnson v. M’Intosh.”). Kades’s account, much of which is a subtle and richly informed narrative of the land speculation and legal maneuvering that brought the case to the Supreme Court
more than fifty years after the first purported sale of the parcel in dispute, is an apt and precise
interpretation of the several pages of the opinion in which Marshall labors to show that no
European or settler sovereign has ever acted in North America on any principle other than the
one on which he decides the case—the rule of discovery, that the colonial sovereign has the
exclusive power to dispose of native lands. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572–84. This
quasi-doctrinal approach, however, may too readily domesticate Johnson, an opinion that continues to fascinate in no small part because of its strangeness: Marshall’s embrace of a legal conclu-
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Appreciating that Johnson is an exercise in imperial jurisprudence recasts the case in a way that partly contradicts each of the competing views. On this interpretation, the portions of Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion conventionally regarded as anomalous, embarrassing, or lawless are in fact applications of the logic of essential legal
concepts of the time—albeit not principles that Marshall was willing
to endorse expressly as law. The customary principle that the European sovereign has the exclusive power to alienate native lands and
thus extinguish native property claims—the principle on which Marshall relies—is nested within a higher-order principle of customary international law, a principle distinguishing between (at least) two types
of sovereigns: full sovereigns whose rights and powers are commensurate with those of European governments, and imperfect sovereigns
whose prerogatives sometimes must yield to the incursions of full sovereigns. The consequence of this principle was to produce two bodies
of international law: one governing relations among full sovereigns,
the other governing relations between full sovereigns and imperfect
sovereigns. Johnson applies the logic of the second body of law, and
many of its otherwise puzzling or ambiguous elements become clear
when read in light of that logic.50
sion he apparently concedes to be deeply unjust, the half-disowned apologetics of his dicta, and
the unclear relationship between the legal conclusion and the historical narrative of the long
aside.
50 This reinterpretation has consequences internal to the debate over the meaning of Johnson. It also has significance for understanding the relationship between the law of that time and
our own. In the interpretation of Johnson, it stands in contrast to Frickey’s account in treating
colonialism not as the antithesis of law, but as itself an integrally legal episode—albeit, as noted,
one whose principles had an ambiguous place in American law. See supra note 48. The principle
distinguishing full sovereigns from imperfect sovereigns is the keystone of the law of colonialism.
By identifying the principles of colonial law operating in Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning, my
interpretation adds to Kades’s by contending that Johnson reflects broader and more diverse
sources than Kades identifies.

The significance of my interpretation for Singer’s account is somewhat more complicated.
The nub of Singer’s view is that Johnson’s grounds contradict today’s conventional conception of
property law; rather than meritorious acquisition, the case rests property rights on racial caste
and aggressive state redistribution. Singer, supra note 47, at 5. He argues that these facts should
reorient our contemporary conceptions of property in favor of both critical debunking of such
justificatory claims and an egalitarian embrace of redistribution. Id. at 51–56. My argument is
that a distinct body of legal principles, and not just bigotry and power, informed the reasoning
Singer condemns. It is not that these principles were much purer than he supposes; they were in
fact both racist in certain of their presuppositions and strikingly committed to a purposive and
sometimes redistributive conception of property. In this respect, my characterization of the case
is akin to Singer’s, at least descriptively, but more nearly internal to the legal thought of the
time. I discuss at the end of this Essay the variety of implications that my interpretation might
be taken to have.
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Having laid the groundwork for the discussion, I now move to an
internal perspective. Interpreting Johnson as an exercise in imperial
jurisprudence is not simply to read the case through the lens of the
political thought of the same period. Rather, the interpretation
emerges from within the case itself, helping to sort out two doctrinal
puzzles and make sense of a question of judicial voice and intent:
Chief Justice Marshall’s heavy irony toward the presuppositions of his
own reasoning.
A. Two Puzzles
1. Indian Land Transfers and Indian Land Transfers,
Distinguished
The first puzzle is Chief Justice Marshall’s summary rejection of a
precedential argument by the party arguing for the validity of Native
American land transfers. The litigants invoked the 1757 opinion of
Great Britain’s Attorney General and Solicitor General, Charles Pratt
and Charles Yorke (later Lords Camden and Morden, respectively),
on the validity of private purchases of land from sovereigns in the
Indian subcontinent.51 The opinion, written to direct the Privy Council in responding to a petition for guidance filed by the East India
Company,52 read as follows:
As to the latter part of the prayer of the petition relative to
the holding or retaining Fortresses or Districts already-acquired or to be acquired by Treaty, Grant or Conquest, We
beg leave to point out some distinctions upon it. In respect
to such Places as have been or shall be acquired by treaty or
Grant from the Mogul or any of the Indian Princes or Governments Your Majestys Letters Patent are not necessary,
the property of the soil vesting in the Company by Indian
Grants subject only to your Majestys right of Sovereignity
[sic] over the Settlements as English Settlements & over the
Inhabitants as English Subjects who carry with them your
Majestys Laws wherever they form Colonies & receive your
Majestys protection by virtue of your Royal Charters. In respect to such places as have lately been acquired or shall
hereafter be acquired by Conquest the property as well as
the Dominion vests in your Majesty by virtue of your known
51

See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 599–600.

Jack M. Sosin, The Yorke-Camden Opinion and American Land Speculators, 85 PA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 38, 38 (1961).
52
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Prerogative & consequently the Company can only derive a
right to them through your Majestys Grant.53
It is known that a redacted version of the opinion was in circulation in
North America by 1773, without language making clear its concern
with subcontinental India, specifically omitting reference to “Moguls”
and “Fortresses or Districts.”54
According to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, the version of the
Yorke-Camden opinion submitted by the plaintiffs in Johnson was
contained in a pamphlet entitled Plain Facts, which the Chief Justice
characterized as “written for the purpose of asserting the Indian title.”55 So far as the version submitted to the Supreme Court is memorialized, it appears to be the redacted version traceable to 1773,
referring to land “‘acquired . . . from any of the Indian princes or
governments,’” and omitting any reference to “the Mogul.”56
Chief Justice Marshall responds to the Yorke-Camden opinion by
distinguishing it based on the specific question to which it was addressed. Observing that Plain Facts acknowledges the opinion’s concern with the East Indies, Marshall flatly states, “It is, of course,
entirely inapplicable to purchases made in America.”57 Why, though,
should a statement of English law, in part concerned with the universal applicability of that same law (to “Subjects who carry with them
your Majestys Laws wherever they form Colonies”), be “of course,
entirely inapplicable”? In each case, the question is whether
purchases by English private parties from non-European sovereigns
are valid without a grant from the Crown. Why is it obvious that the

DIA

53 CHARLES PRATT & CHARLES YORKE, COMMENTARY ON THE RIGHTS
COMPANY (1757), reprinted in Sosin, supra note 52, at 38–39.
54

OF THE

EAST IN-

Sosin, supra note 52, at 39. The full text of the redacted version read as follows:
In respect to such places as have been or shall be acquired by Treaty or Grant from
any of the Indian Princes or Governments; Your Majesty’s Letters Patents are not
necessary, the property of the soil vesting in the Grantees by the Indian Grants; Subject only to your Majesty’s Right of Sovereignty over the Settlements as English
Settlements and over the Inhabitants as English Subjects who carry with them your
Majesty’s Laws wherever they form Colonys and receive your Majesty’s Protection
by Virtue of your Royal Charters.

LORD CHANCELLOR CAMDEN & LORD CHANCELLOR YORKE, OPINION ON TITLES DERIVED BY
THE KING’S SUBJECTS FROM THE INDIANS OR NATIVES (1772), reprinted in Sosin, supra note 52,
at 39.
55

Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 599.

Id. at 599–600 (“ ‘In respect to such places as have been, or shall be acquired, by treaty
or grant, from any of the Indian princes or governments, your majesty’s letters patent are not
necessary.’ ” (quoting the Yorke-Camden opinion)).
56

57

Id. at 599.
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answer to this question, posed as to India, has no bearing on the question when it is posed as to North America?
In bolstering his assertion that the Yorke-Camden opinion must
be irrelevant, Marshall observes that the terms “‘princes or governments’ are usually applied to the East Indians but not to those of
North America. We speak of their sachems, their warriors, their
chiefmen, their nations or tribes, not of their ‘princes or governments.’”58 This is a peculiar point, because the parsing of terms is
superfluous as evidence of the geographic scope of the Yorke-Camden
opinion’s relevance as precedent.59 What the point rather does is to
call attention to the differences in the forms of indigenous sovereignty
within North America and India. “Princes and governments” are
terms characteristically applied to European sovereigns as well as
those of India. The terms Marshall imputes to Native Americans,
however, suggest less institutionally sophisticated forms of sovereignty, defined by holy men (“sachems”), military leaders (“warriors”
and “chiefs”), and ethnic or language groups (“nations or tribes”).60
Id. at 600.
Chief Justice Marshall’s other basis of distinction seems based on a willful misreading of
the Yorke-Camden opinion. He writes, “The question on which the opinion was given, . . . and
to which it relates, was, whether the king’s subjects carry with them the common law wherever
they may form settlements. The opinion is given with a view to this point . . . .” Id. So far as I
can tell, the only fair reading of either version of the Yorke-Camden opinion must recognize the
reference to the geographically unlimited jurisdiction of English law over the King’s subjects as a
proviso to its primary conclusion that private parties may make valid purchases from foreign
sovereigns without a grant from the King.
60 “Nation” is clearly the outlier. The Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”) defines the
term as an “aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent,
language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political
state.” THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. 10, at 231 (2d ed. 1989). The OED further
notes, “In early examples the racial idea is usually stronger than the political; in recent use the
notion of political unity and independence is more prominent.” Id. The examples given refer to
“nation” in the sense of peoples consistently until 1852 (when readers encounter a citation to
Tennyson’s “mourning of a mighty nation”). Id. By association with Chief Justice Marshall’s
other terms, his “nation” is drawn in the direction of “people” or “tribe.” Ironically, just two
pages later, Marshall refers to “grants from the native princes” in quoting from a letter describing the acquisition of land in “Narraghanset country, in New-England.” Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 602. A piece of contemporary evidence comes from an 1828 opinion of the Missouri
Supreme Court dealing with enslavement of Native Americans:
In America, the word nation is not of the same import as in other parts of the
globe: here it is applied to small societies or independent tribes or communities,
who subsist by hunting over a vast extent of territory; whose ideas of property are
limited to the game they catch or kill: amongst whom there is no distinction but
what arises from personal qualities, being without government authority, subordination or prescribed duties—whose actions flow from the impulse of their own feelings or passions, unchecked, uncontrolled, unpunished.
Marguerite v. Chouteau, 2 Mo. 71, 92 (1828) (emphasis added), overruled by 3 Mo. 540 (1834).
58
59
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2. Customary International Law and Customary International
Law, Distinguished
I suggest that Chief Justice Marshall’s distinction tracks that between perfect and imperfect sovereigns, gets at the same underlying
contrasts, and essentially informs his reasoning in Johnson. The best
way to approach this issue, however, is through the second puzzle in
the opinion: Marshall’s reasoning in ruling that the customary international law governing relations between conquering and conquered nations did not apply in North America. As Marshall explains it, “[t]hat
law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations
between the conqueror and the conquered”61 is “a general rule” which
“[h]umanity . . . acting on public opinion, has established.”62 In broad
formulation, this law forbids inhumane or oppressive treatment of
conquered peoples.63 More specifically, it directs “that the rights of
the conquered to property should remain unimpaired; that the new
subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of
being separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to
strangers.”64
The first thing to note about this “law” or “general rule” is that,
as a legal principle, it appears to stand on all fours with the rule of
discovery that controls the result in Johnson: both are principles of
customary international law.65 The rule of discovery, too, was “a principle” which the European powers recognized as “necessary, in order
to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other,
to establish” and “which all should acknowledge as the law by which
the right of acquisition . . . should be regulated as between them61

Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.

62

Id. at 589.

See id. (“[T]he conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and . . . their condition shall
remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest.”). What degree of “eligibility” was compatible with the objects of European colonization in North America is a question I
shortly reach.
63

64

Id.

Writing in 1826, James Kent designated three sources of international law, custom
among them:
65

The law of nations is a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It consists of general principles of right and justice, equally suitable to the government of
individuals in a state of natural equality and to the relations and conduct of nations;
of a collection of usages and customs, the growth of civilization and commerce; and
of a code of conventional or positive law.
JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES

ON

AMERICAN LAW *3–4 (emphasis added).
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selves.”66 Marshall’s evidence for the status of the rule of discovery is
not any express adoption of it by Europe’s sovereigns—it is not treaty
law—but rather the fact that the countries of Europe have, in practice,
abided by it.67
It is around the refusal to apply this principle to Native American
possessory custom—the refusal to recognize local possessory custom
as constituting a property right due respect under the law of conquest—that Marshall seems to express the most pronounced ambivalence about his reasoning and its result. The “restriction” on Native
American rights “may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages
of civilized nations,”68 and it is not derived from “those principles of
abstract justice . . . which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree,
the rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged.”69 The restriction, instead, subordinates the principle that conquerors must respect the property rights of the conquered to the
principle of discovery, “that great and broad rule by which its civilized
inhabitants now hold this country.”70 Why does the latter principle
carry the day? Is it only a matter of the constraint placed on the
courts by the facts of expropriation and settlement—the legacy of
machtpolitik? Or is it more?
B. Some Irony
Whether because of these doctrinal puzzles or for some other reason, Chief Justice Marshall does not write in Johnson like a man entirely satisfied with the reasoning he is constrained to apply. His
heavy irony suggests a suspicion that his decision is rendered in the
final act of a historic tragedy, one whose protagonists are obtuse in
rough proportion to their culpability. The Europeans he portrays are
the self-satisfied and opportunistic landgrabbers of Diderot’s and
Montaigne’s attacks on imperialism; nonetheless, their land grabs
form the source of governing law for Marshall’s opinion. He hints at a
similarly grim view of the U.S. law that he applies. It is unquestionably the positive law of a sovereign that has followed the European
powers in claiming North America. To depart too far from the soverJohnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
Id. at 584 (concluding, after a several-page survey of the history of European acquisition
and conflict in North America, that “all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on
this continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognised in others, the exclusive right of
the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians”).
68 Id. at 591.
69 Id. at 572.
70 Id. at 587.
66
67
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eign’s positive law would be inconsistent with being a judge of the
United States; without his sovereign, a judge is only an opinionated
man in a black robe. Nonetheless, Marshall relentlessly implies, the
law that guides his opinion is not just.
Thus, describing the European encounter with North America,
Marshall reports that
the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior
genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. The potentates
of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves
that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the
new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in
exchange for unlimited independence.71
An “apology” is somewhere between a justification and an excuse; it
seeks to vindicate or redeem something that needs it, but the word
carries a hint of suspicion, starting with the fact that the redemption is
so badly needed. The account of European “potentates[’]” reasoning
is deliberately removed, giving an unmistakably arch tone to the
description. Marshall tells us not that they reasoned convincingly, not
that they discovered true principles, but that, in the notoriously opportunism-prone position of being judges in their own cases, they
“found no difficulty in convincing themselves” of the justice of conquest and expropriation. This is the weakest endorsement Marshall
could possibly have given, if it is an endorsement at all.72
The same tone appears when Marshall describes the European
colonizers’ options upon realizing (as he asserts they did) that they
could neither assimilate Native Americans nor coexist with them “as a
distinct people,” as otherwise applicable customary law would have
required them to do.73 This pair of impossibilities put the Europeans
“under the necessity either of abandoning the country, and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the
sword.”74 Marshall has already told us that claims originated in a selfinterested attempt to escape the traditional bounds of customary international law: at this juncture his insertion of the modifier “pom71

Id. at 573.

Moreover, “potentates” is just about the least complimentary term for rulers, short of
an insult; it designates power, not legitimacy or authority, and it carries hints of sumptuous
despotism.
72

73

Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589–90.

74

Id. at 590.
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pous” reminds the reader that although these claims have the form
and force of law, their origins lie in self-serving opportunism.
Yet their indecent origin does not disestablish these principles as
the law Chief Justice Marshall must apply in Johnson. It is no surprise, then, that even as he applies the law he endorses it only with the
weak suggestion that “it may, perhaps, be supported by reason . . .
[h]owever [much it] may be opposed to natural right” and “[h]owever
extravagant the pretension” on which it rests.75 What gives force to a
principle with such dubious origins is its status in the U.S. legal system
and way of life; it may win rational assent “if it be indispensable to
that system under which the country has been settled.”76 In discussing
the authority of basic and settled social and historical facts, Marshall is
careful to counterpose it to the demands of conscience: “Conquest
gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever
the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting
the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”77
I do not think it is overreading to take this passage as a broad hint that
the “private and speculative opinions” are Marshall’s, and that he did
not personally partake of the legally inescapable conclusion that the
claims of expropriation were just.
To rule otherwise, according to abstract considerations of justice,
would have meant ceasing to be an organ of the American legal system, which rested both the coherence of its property system and its
government’s ultimate claim to sovereignty on the legitimacy of European expropriation. In the very act of denying that expropriation was
legally effective, Marshall would have stepped outside the language
game of a federal judge of the United States. His irony was thus an
expression of conscience and independent judgment that was as necessarily impotent as the governing law he inherited was necessarily
authoritative.
Yet there is irony within the irony, for Chief Justice Marshall is
not simply asserting the traditional ironist’s prerogative of maintaining independent judgment in a world full of corruption and compromise.78 Rather, his expressions of ambivalence come along with a
capsule history of North America that is not ironic critique, but pragId. at 591–92.
Id. at 591.
77 Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
78 Montaigne, for instance, concludes Of Cannibals, a wending and often gripping discussion of the way that judging others “barbarians” obscures both their human traits and our own
barbarous qualities, with a despairing suggestion that all his efforts will fall on deaf ears. Having
made a case for Native Americans’ humaneness and sense of morality, and having decried Span75
76
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matic justification of Euro-American policy.79 Marshall sets this history outside both the “extravagant” principles of conquest and the
“speculative” principles of “natural right.” Even as he notes that “we
do not mean to engage in the defence of those principles which
Europeans have applied to Indian title”—only their application—he
concedes that “they may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been
wrested from them.”80 What does that mean, and how is it different
from the “pompous claims” and cruel logic which Europe’s potentates
found no difficulty in persuading themselves to accept? Marshall proposes here to move into the realm of what I earlier called “cultural
interpretation,” and to find some partial resolution there of the paradoxes and ironies that dogged his reasoning.
In the next three Parts, I argue that both the purely doctrinal puzzles of the opinion and its irony-within-irony manner make sense only
in light of its ambivalent but essential debt to the law of imperial jurisprudence and its backdrop of cultural and historical interpretation.
II. Two Domains of International Law
Each of the passages I have discussed as sources of puzzles in
Johnson makes critical use of the term “civilized.” It is natural, reading today, to pass over the word in embarrassed silence, as an anachronistic gesture of self-congratulation. If it is that, however, I want to
suggest that in its context it is also a legally significant term with
meaning for interpretation of the case. The effect of Chief Justice
Marshall’s usage is (1) to distinguish between civilized nations,
“whose perfect independence is acknowledged,”81 and others that
have achieved neither civilization nor the corresponding status of
“perfect independence” in relations among nations; and (2) correspondingly, to distinguish between two spheres of principles: those
that govern relations among civilized nations and, by implication,
those that govern relations between civilized and uncivilized nations.
Thus, to say that a principle governs “the rights of civilized nations” or
“the usages of civilized nations” does not imply that the same principle presumptively governs colonial relations, and thus that deviation
from it is deviation into sheer pragmatism (in the pejorative sense of
ish abuses of conquered peoples, he ends with, “[W]hat’s the use? They [the Indians] don’t wear
breeches.” MONTAIGNE, supra note 30, at 159.
79 I discuss this history and its significance to the case in Part IV, infra.
80 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
81 Id. at 572.
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that word) or power politics. Rather, the term “civilized” specifies the
domain of relations that the principle governs and, conversely, the domain where it is inapplicable.
This interpretation draws on the recent work in legal history of
Edward Keene.82 Keene puts his thesis lucidly enough that quoting it
at length is efficient. Describing the governing concepts of international law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Keene
argues as follows:
Within Europe, the leading purpose of international order
was to promote peaceful coexistence in a multicultural world
through the toleration of other political systems, cultures and
ways of life. Its basic principle of respecting dynastic rulers’
rights to govern their domestic possessions in their own way,
which gradually changed into the principle that each nation
had a right to self-determination, was rooted in the beliefs
that different cultures were equally valuable and should be
given space to flourish; and that the best way to ensure peace
in the society of states was to encourage its members to eschew violence for religious, cultural, or ideological reasons.
Beyond Europe, however, international order was dedicated to a quite different purpose: the promotion of civilization. Simply put, Europeans and Americans believed that
they knew how other governments should be organized, and
actively worked to restructure societies that they regarded as
uncivilized so as to encourage economic progress and stamp
out the barbarism, corruption, despotism and incompetence
that they believed to be characteristic of most indigenous regimes. Especially in North America, this was also connected
with the idea that the whole continent was an uncultivated
wilderness, which needed to be civilized through the establishment of properly ordered settlements . . . .83
This formulation combines two normative domains which, I have
been arguing, were essentially intertwined in the law of imperialism.
One comprises legal interpretation of principles governing relations
among sovereigns, the other cultural and historical interpretation of
See generally KEENE, supra note 9.
Id. at 98–99. Keene later reported that
[a] consistent theme in textbooks on international law from the middle of the nineteenth century on was the distinction between the family of civilized nations, which
was seen as roughly synonymous with the society of states who had achieved recognition as fully independent sovereigns, and the uncivilized world beyond, of territories and peoples that had not yet achieved such recognition.
Id. at 114.
82
83
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the divergent societies: how they came to be as they are and what
normative significance their diversity has. In Keene’s account, the
central difference between the two domains of international law was
that “civilized” countries counted as fully independent sovereigns (in
Chief Justice Marshall’s words, their “perfect independence is acknowledged”), while the governments of uncivilized peoples enjoyed
imperfect sovereignty. Their sovereign powers were conditional on
the degree of their adherence to principles of civilization, which could
be freely enforced by civilized sovereigns. As Keene puts it,
the independence of indigenous ‘semi-sovereign’ rulers was
constrained by imperial and moral considerations. Their
sovereignty was acknowledged, but they were placed under
an obligation to obey the paramount [civilized] power in
matters of strategic and military concern. They were also
vulnerable to interventions by the imperial power in order to
check the dangers of misgovernment that, in European eyes,
arose from placing political authority in the hands of uncivilized rulers.84
The powers of imperfect sovereigns were thus constrained by
their competence to secure and advance a concept of civilization specified by cultural and historical interpretation. They might lack competence either materially, in the institutional wherewithal to perform
certain high-level tasks of governance; or as a matter of character (individual or, more likely on the older accounts, collective or cultural),
the attributes necessary to make and maintain appropriate judgments
regarding interest and principle.
This view, as Keene expresses it, had scant explicit jurisprudential
purchase in the United States at the time of Johnson v. M’Intosh.
Writing three years later, James Kent asserted the absolute equality of
nations and the principle of noninterference as the bases of international law.85 Kent nonetheless recited and defended the discovery
doctrine in his account of Johnson v. M’Intosh, setting it in the context
of its justifying historical narrative. Kent contended that in “the necessity of the case,” “[t]he peculiar character and habits of the Indian
nations rendered them incapable of sustaining any other relation with
the whites than that of dependence and pupilage.”86 He continued,
“There was no other way of dealing with them than that of keeping
them separate, subordinate, and dependent, with a guardian care
84
85
86

Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added).
JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES
JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES
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thrown around them for their protection. . . . Indian title was
subordinate to the absolute, ultimate title of the government of the
European colonists . . . .”87 All this, and the characterization of Native
Americans as “domestic dependent nations,” relating to the United
States as “a ward to his guardian,”88 was in apparent tension with
Kent’s premise that “as far as Indian nations had formed themselves
into regular organized governments, within reasonable and definite
limits necessary for the hunter state, there would seem [to have been]
no ground to deny the absolute nature of their territorial and political
rights.”89 In other words, American jurisprudence in this period was
much more wary than European thinking of the authorizing power of
“civilization.” It did acknowledge and carry out the logic of the two
domains of international relations; it did not explicitly give the second,
colonial body of law equal status. The effect of this ambivalence—this
hostility to the very logic to which American law was simultaneously
capitulating—includes the “puzzles” of Marshall’s opinion in Johnson,
his reservations about the status of his own reasoning. In the American setting, the body of principles governing colonial relations was not
expressly acknowledged as law, but its logic deeply shaped legal
reasoning.
What was that logic? To justify the superior authority of the civilized sovereign, cultural interpretation in service of any theory of divided and hierarchical sovereignty requires at least three elements.
First is some account of the interests or rights advanced and secured
by “civilization,” which serves to identify circumstances in which civilization’s defense may justify overriding or supplanting an imperfect
sovereign. For instance, this account may specify certain rights whose
violation by an imperfect sovereign is a per se justification of intervention to the extent necessary to vindicate those rights. This was the
primary strategy of the Dominican jurist Vitoria in his (mostly critical)
survey of possible justifications for Spanish claims to the Americas.90
In his account of the legitimacy of British imperial rule in India, John
Stuart Mill took a more consequentialist view, concentrating on the
idea that all persons everywhere have interests in the progressive development of voluntary institutions and freedom-loving personalities,
which, when some peoples are trapped in culturally stagnant despoId. at *381.
Id. at *382.
89 Id. at *386.
90 See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the American Indians, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 231,
272–86 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991).
87
88
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tisms, may be advanced only by the intervention and reform that imperial government can provide.91 I concentrate on this second type of
argument because it is the one most pertinent to the episode of legal
history I am exploring, and especially to making sense of Johnson v.
M’Intosh.
Second, such an account must give some diagnosis of the failure
of the imperfect sovereign to secure or promote the interests or rights
at stake. This will, of course, be a more robust account when interests
of the sort Mill contends for are at stake than in the case of a simple
violation of inviolable rights. There must be some account of how the
imperfect sovereign has failed to promote or secure the interests of its
population. Otherwise, trying to identify the specific dimension of
sovereignty in which it has shown itself incompetent and in which it
may be overridden would be to pursue an obscure and elusive quarry.
Third, an account of the prerogative of civilized sovereigns should
describe how they can vindicate authoritative rights or interests by
taking over certain powers from imperfect sovereigns. Otherwise, the
superior sovereign can only identify failures in the imperfect sovereign; it cannot say—or know how to do—what would vindicate the
interests the imperfect sovereign has neglected or betrayed. One such
theory, giving an account of culture and history sufficient to found an
account of legal relations among distinct types of sovereigns, emerged
from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Anglo-American imperial
thought. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion expresses the logic of that
theory.
In the next Part of this Essay, I show that theories about how
property regimes evolved, and what their level of development revealed about the societies in which they existed, were central to making operational the distinction between civilized and imperfect
sovereigns. I pursue this point by two routes: first, through the general view of property as a key to progress in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal thought, notably that of William Blackstone and
Adam Smith; and, second, through a discussion of the use to which the
British put property reform in their “progressive” governance of India—specifically in the 1793 reforms of property rights in the Indian
states of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

91 See MILL, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 16, at 217–34. Mill, for instance, characterized
India’s peoples as “unfitted for representative government . . . by extreme passiveness[ ] and
ready submission to tyranny.” Id. at 238.
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III. Property in the Law of Colonialism
A. Property in the Eighteenth-Century Account of Progress and
Governance
An account of property gave institutional specificity to the account of progress that filled out the theory of imperialism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Anglo-American law. The account of
property was the bridge between the legally operational features of
the theory and its broader cultural and historical dimensions.
The backdrop of the account was a development in European historiography, occasioned both by growing systematic study of the past
and by the experience of imperialism, which brought the diversity of
human societies irresistibly to European attention. Eighteenth-century historians proposed a homology between the historical diversity
of societies across time and their present diversity around the world.92
On this theory, the European historical experience—rendered in a
highly stylized way—formed a master template of societal evolution,
describing a passage from a hunter-gatherer existence through a nomadic herding economy to settled agriculture, culminating in the complex institutions of commercial society.93 Other contemporary
societies were assumed to fall into the categories of earlier European
experience, so that they could be classified by their place on the
civilizational timeline that Europe had defined.94 Thus William Blackstone, in his introductory discussion of the law of property, illustrated
the hunter-gatherer stage by reference to
the manners of many American nations when first discovered by the Europeans; and from the ancient method of living among the first Europeans themselves, if we may credit
either the memorials of them preserved in the golden age of
the poets, or the uniform accounts given by historians of
those times.95

92 For a discussion of the “four-stages theory” of human history and its origins in European historiographic debate, with particular attention to the thought of Samuel Pufendorf and
Adam Smith, see ISTVAN HANT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE
NATION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 159–84, 354–88 (2005). For a theoretical and historical overview of the strategies and problems of this mode of “universal history” as a justification for empire, see MEHTA, supra note 9, at 77–114.
93

See HANT, supra note 92, at 159–84, 354–88.
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See id.
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He similarly explained that the basic principle of real property for the
stage of nomadic herder societies, the right to move one’s stock onto
unoccupied land,
is still retained among the wild and uncultivated nations that
have never been formed into civil states, like the Tartars and
others in the east; where the climate itself, and the boundless
extent of their territory, conspire to retain them still in the
same savage state of vagrant liberty, which was universal in
the earliest ages.96
“Tacitus informs us” further that this practice “continued among the
Germans till the decline of the Roman empire.”97 From this perspective, then, the present lives of non-European societies were way-stations along the history of Europe.
Adam Smith maintained:
[T]he laws of [occupation] vary according to the periods of
human society. The four stages of society are hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce. . . . The age of commerce
naturaly succeeds that of agriculture. As men could now
confine themselves to one species of labour, they would
naturaly exchange the surplus of their own commodity for
that of another of which they stood in need. According to
these stages occupation must vary. . . .
....
. . . Among savages property begins and ends with possession, and they seem scarce to have any idea of any thing
as their own which is not about their own bodies.
Among shepherds the idea of property is further extended. . . . When it first became necessary to cultivate the
earth, no person had any property in it, and the little plot
which was dressed near their hovels would be common to the
whole village, and the fruits would be equally divided among
the individuals. . . . Private property in land never begins till
a division be made from common agreement, which is generally when cities begin to be built . . . . An Arab or a Tartar
will drive his flocks over an immense country without supposing a single grain of sand in it his own.98
The law of property formed the institutional keystone of this theory of history. Property rights were the exemplary indicators of a
Id. at *6.
Id.
98 ADAM SMITH, Private Law, in LECTURES
et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1766).
96
97

ON

JURISPRUDENCE 459, 459–60 (R.L. Meek
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stage of civilization, corresponding in fairly neat ways to the sequential modes of social order and productive activity. In the earliest
stage, there was a right of exclusive use only in one’s personal possessions—those things one had appropriated or made—and a general,
nonexclusive right of occupation and use of all other resources. In the
herding stage, the signal feature of the property system was a strong
collective right of exclusive use in herding grounds, coupled with a
right to expropriate unoccupied land for one’s own herds. For the first
time with the advent of settled agriculture, there arose the classical
private ownership of Blackacre. Finally, with commercial society,
came liberalized land markets and the commodification of labor as an
alienable resource, accompanied by increasingly voluntary economic
relations mediated by contract and bounded by the right of exit.
Property regimes were not, however, only diagnostic in their significance; they also provided an Archimedean lever by which reformers
could induce change from one level of civilization to another.99 By
breaking the grip on the power of elites wedded to old regimes and
reordering incentives to induce dynamic efficiency, it was possible to
move an entire society forward in history—that is, along the civilizational timeline marked out by Europe’s historical experience.100
The significance of this fact for legal relations between civilized
and imperfect sovereigns was to identify at once the antiprogressive
features of existing social systems and the shape of the reforms that
would overcome those barriers to progress. In doing this, the theory
of property picked out areas in which imperfect sovereigns were incompetent to secure the interests of their populations and directed
civilized sovereigns in taking over the sovereign powers of their imperfect counterparts. Property theory also made coherent a hierarchy
of imperfect sovereigns by identifying key legal features of each stage
of civilization. The diagnostic and normative functions of the theory
were closely linked. The “earlier” the stage, the farther the imperfect
sovereign from “perfect independence” and the greater the prerogative of the relevant civilized sovereign.
99 For discussions of the general program and intellectual context of this reform agenda,
see RANAJIT GUHA, A RULE OF PROPERTY FOR BENGAL: AN ESSAY ON THE IDEA OF PERMANENT SETTLEMENT (1996). Guha studies the intellectual and political thought that formed the
backdrop to property reform, and concentrates on the widely and strongly held belief that property rights would propel Indian economy and society toward commercial modernity. Edward
Keene gives a consonant account in KEENE, supra note 9, at 88–94.
100 See GUHA, supra note 99; KEENE, supra note 9, at 88–94; infra notes 102–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian reform program of Lord Cornwallis, Phillip Francis, and their
contemporaries).
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B. Property in East India: The Context of the Yorke-Camden
Opinion
I earlier raised the “puzzle” of why Chief Justice Marshall so
readily set aside the Yorke-Camden opinion: what exactly did it mean
to “distinguish” land purchases from East Indian sovereigns from land
purchases from Native American peoples?101 It would have to mean
that East Indian governments occupied a different tier in the hierarchy of imperfect sovereigns from that of North American peoples,
such that the power of disposing of property remained substantially in
the hands of East Indian governments even as it fell out of the hands
of North American sovereigns. I believe this distinction has essentially to do with the property regimes of the respective imperfect sovereigns. I develop this argument, first, through an inspection of the
Anglo-American attitude toward each regime.
There is a thin but helpful literature on the British view of property law in the Indian colonies. While I trace some of that literature
through footnotes, I concentrate on an exemplary discussion of the
issue by Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General of India from 1786 until
1793 (and again from 1805 to his death at Ghazipur, near Varanasi
(Benares)). Cornwallis’s papers on Indian property regimes102 during
his first governorship were among the formative contributions to the
British policy of Permanent Settlement, by which India’s British overseers sought to turn a feudal tax-based regime inherited from the decrepit Moghul empire103 into the foundations of a modern, fee-simple
system of property rights.104 The regime the British found on arrival
See supra Part I.A.1.
See LORD CORNWALLIS, 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE STATE PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS
GENERAL OF INDIA 72–126 (George Forrest ed., 1926).
103 The Moghuls emerged from Central Asia and began the conquest of much of India in
the thirteenth century. By the time British traders arrived on India’s northeast coast, Moghul
capitals, such as Calcutta in Bengal, had fallen into profound dysfunction. The British began
their eventual conquest of India by contractually undertaking to supplant the Moghuls in sovereign activities that those rulers were literally no longer competent to undertake, beginning with
tax collection and proceeding rapidly to defense, policing, and the administration of justice. The
role, if any, of this experience in giving force to the idea of degrees of sovereign competence
would merit investigation.
104 The closest thing to an authoritative study of the Permanent Settlement is GUHA, supra
note 99; see also KEENE, supra note 9, at 88–94. For a fascinating near-contemporary criticism,
not of the idea but of the implementation of the Permanent Settlement, see MILL, HISTORY,
supra note 16, at 476–93. James Mill contended that the reform failed because it placed ownership in the hands of the aristocratic Zemindars, to whom he ascribed a class-based taste for
arbitrary power over increased wealth. Id. at 484–93. He held this preference responsible for
the Zemindars’ failure to make economically rational improvements in the agriculture, in favor
of maintaining repressive authority over the ryots. Id. at 488–93. This in turn he blamed on the
101
102
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was one in which “property” rights amounted in effect to a pyramid of
geographically specific tax-collecting powers.105 The central government annually set an exaction for the Zemindars, regional and local
administrators and landlords, who in turn exacted from farmers (ryots) in their jurisdictions enough tribute to satisfy the Zemindars’ obligation to the government with as much left over as possible.106 The
economic consequences of this arrangement were widely appreciated
among British students of Indian affairs.107 Uncertainty as to the future tax (or rent—the systems were one and the terms used interchangeably) burden created a strong disincentive to improve the land:
there was no guarantee of recouping the gains from improvement
rather than seeing them consumed by an increased exaction, imposed
either arbitrarily or in response to the improvements themselves.108
As a result, agricultural practice remained stagnant out of a kind of
sullen self-defense by the landlords and farmers, and there was little
effort to develop uncleared lands.109 This total failure of dynamic effiinfluence of “the aristocratical ideas of modern Europe” on Cornwallis and others. Id. at
486–89. He argued that a more egalitarian allocation of property rights would have achieved the
intended effect:
It is the man of small possessions who feels most sensibly the benefit of petty accessions; and is stimulated the most powerfully to use the means of procuring them. It
is on the immediate cultivator, wherever the benefit of his improvements is allowed
to devolve in full upon himself, that the motives to improvement operate with the
greatest effect. That benefit, however, cannot devolve upon him in full, unless he is
the proprietor as well as the cultivator of his fields . . . .
Id. at 493.
105 See GUHA, supra note 99, at 91–111.
106 MILL, HISTORY, supra note 16, at 481–86.
107 See, e.g., CORNWALLIS, supra note 102.
108 As Cornwallis wrote in 1789,
In a country where the landlord has a permanent property in the soil it will be
worth his while to encourage his tenants who hold his farm in lease to improve the
property; at any rate he will make such an agreement with them as will prevent
their destroying it. But when the lord of the soil himself, the rightful owner, is only
to become the farmer for a lease of ten years [Cornwallis was commenting on a
proposal to freeze exaction rates for a ten-year period], and if he is then to be
exposed to the demand of a new rent, which may perhaps be dictated by ignorance
or rapacity, what hops can there be, I will not say of improvement, but of preventing desolation? Will it not be in his interest, during the early part of that term, to
extract from his estate every possible advantage for himself; and if any future hopes
of a permanent settlement are then held out, to exhibit his lands at the end of it in a
state of ruin?
Id. at 74.
109 Cornwallis wrote,
I may safely assert that one-third of the [East India] Company’s territory in
Hindostan [India] is now a jungle inhabited only by wild beasts. Will a ten years’
lease induce any proprietor to clear away that jungle, and encourage the ryots to
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ciency meant lesser revenues for the East India Company, which had
replaced the Moghuls at the top of the tax-farming pyramid. It also
became a major humanitarian issue after 1770, when famine devastated Bengal.110 The famine was widely reported in the British and
American press, and it was recognized as a symptom of an unstable
and confused system of property rights and consequent inefficient
land use.111
Lord Cornwallis, like most reformers active in Indian affairs, understood the Permanent Settlement as a way of securing the benefits
of a modern property system—chiefly, dynamic efficiency in the improvement of land. It seemed clear to him that the feckless industry
of India and the arbitrary and tyrannical exactions that ran down the
tax-farming pyramid were consequences of the legal regime, and not
of any inherent defects in the Indians. As he put it, “[t]he habit which
the Zemindars have fallen into, of subsisting by annual expedients has
originated, not in any constitutional imperfections in the people themselves, but in the fluctuating measures of Government.”112 Developing this theme in a later 1789 response to another reformer who had
expressed doubt that the Zemindars could catch “a spirit of improvement,” Cornwallis insisted,
Mr. Shore observes that we have experience in what
Zemindars are; but the experience of what they are, or have
been, under one system, is by no means the proper criterion
to determine what they would be under the influence of another, founded upon very different principles. We have no
experience of what the Zemindars would be under the system which I recommend to be adopted.113
He proceeded to envision a day not far away “[w]hen a spirit of improvement is suffused throughout the country” by the influence of a
new property regime.114
Reformers envisioned several types of benefits from the Permanent Settlement. The first was in the motivation and activity of Indicome and cultivate his lands, when at the end of that lease he must either submit to
be taxed ad libitum for their newly cultivated land, or lose all hopes of deriving any
benefit from his labour, for which perhaps by that time he will hardly be repayed?
Id. at 74–75.
110 David Arnold, Hunger in the Garden of Plenty, in DREADFUL VISITATIONS 81 passim
(Alessa Johns ed., 1999).
111 Id. at 93.
112 CORNWALLIS, supra note 102, at 75.
113 Id. at 95.
114 Id.
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ans, the “spirit of improvement” just mentioned, which Lord
Cornwallis expected to “render our subjects the happiest people in
India.”115 The second lay in raison d’etat, the development of revenue
and economic activity to build the power of the sovereign—in this
case, a status divided between the East India Company, whose sovereign power was being increasingly absorbed into Parliament, and local
governors and institutions. The new “wealth and prosperity” of the
Indians, Cornwallis ventured, “will infallibly add to the strength and
resources of the State.”116 The third was in political culture. By binding the interests of property holders to the state that created and secured a regime favorable to their interests, the Permanent Settlement
would create loyalty to the state, rather than the opportunism and
shifting allegiances characteristic of those who believe they can get a
better deal under another ruler.117 The fourth lay in the structure of
government itself. In Cornwallis’s view, a state that depended on frequently revised tax exactions tacked inevitably toward the arbitrary
and shifting demands on its subjects that were the hallmarks of despotism. The same organs of government that should secure the liberties and facilitate the prosperity of subjects assumed instead, by the
logic of incentives and through the temptations of unregulated power,
an inconstant and confiscatory attitude toward the population. India’s
land regime thus trapped not only landholders, but also its state in a
pattern of irregular and ultimately counterproductive behavior that
registered upon the European mind as feudal. A modern land regime
depended on a modern state; but just as essentially, a state given a
modern land regime to administer would be much more capable of
assuming the regular and rule-governed activity of modern
government.118
Id. at 115.
Id.
117 Cornwallis wrote,
In case of a foreign invasion, it is a matter of the last importance, considering
the means by which we keep possession of the country, that the proprietors of the
land should be attached to us from motives of self-interest. A land-holder who is
secured on the quiet enjoyment of a profitable estate can have no motive in wishing
for a change. On the contrary, if the rents of his lands are raised in proportion to
their improvement; if he is liable to be dispossessed should he refuse to pay the
increase required of him; or if threatened with imprisonment or confiscation of his
property on account of balance due to Government which his lands were unequal
to pay, he will readily listen to any offers which are likely to bring about a change
that cannot place him in a worse situation, but which hold to him hopes of a better.
Id. at 113.
118 Cornwallis wrote,
Until the assessment on the lands is fixed, the constitution of our internal gov115
116
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This last point is particularly important. On one influential eighteenth- and nineteenth-century view, the political and moral significance of modernity, or, differently put, the promise of Enlightenment,
was the steady diminution of arbitrary power, whether of states over
their citizens or of private persons over others; slavery, tyranny, and
despotism were essentially linked terms in this conception, each denoting arbitrary power which corresponded to the abject vulnerability
of others.119 Lord Cornwallis’s account of the Permanent Settlement
is also a theory of modernization, or progress, based in a diagnosis and
prescription for India’s property system, but linked to an idea of essential human interests and how they may be realized.
This is a highly purposive conception of property, in which the
institution is regarded instrumentally, in relation to fixed human interests in liberty and prosperity. I now turn to two questions about the
ernment in [India] will never take that form which alone can lead to the establishment of good laws and ensure a due administration of them. For whilst the
assessment is liable to frequent variation, a great portion of the time and attention
of the supreme Board, and the unremitting application of the Company’s servants
of the first abilities and most established integrity will be required to prevent the
land-holders being plundered and the revenues of government being diminished at
every new settlement; and powers and functions which ought to be lodged in different hands must continue, as at present, vested in the same person; and whilst they
remain so united we cannot expect that the laws which may be enacted for the
protection of the rights and property of the land-holders and cultivators of the soil
will ever be duly enforced.
Id. A passage from Blackstone also aptly illustrates this idea:
Necessity begat property; and, in order to insure that property, recourse was had to
civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants;
states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties.
Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of society was sufficient to
provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure
was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay
the foundations of science.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *8. One can hardly imagine a more succinct claim for property’s
central necessity to civilization.
119 The most elegant characterization of this view in my acquaintance is Emma
Rothschild’s:
The most heroic outcome, in this history of the human spirit [Adam Smith’s
view of Enlightenment], was to be the slow vanquishing of fear. . . .
....
The great promise of commercial and liberal society—of the liberal plan of
equality, liberty, and justice . . . —is that the minds of individuals will be less frightened, and their lives less frightening. Commerce will flourish only in a state with a
regular administration of justice, or in which there is a certain degree of confidence
in the justice of government.
EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 12, 14 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
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consequences of this conception of property. First, how does this account affect any obligation of the civilized sovereign to respect the
existing property arrangements of the imperfect sovereign, as it would
those of another full sovereign? Second, can this account help us to
make sense of the treatment of Native American property regimes in
Johnson v. M’Intosh?
Let us begin with the first question. In his papers on Indian reform, Lord Cornwallis proposed a middle course between noninterference and usurpation of existing Indian property rights. He stressed
that, on his reading of Indian history, “the Zemindars have the best
right” to the land,120 and acknowledged that, to the extent the Permanent Settlement denied the Zemindars some of their old powers of
extraction from subordinates, they would be due compensation by “a
fair equivalent” even though their right was subject to legal eradication because it was “a right that was incompatible with public welfare.”121 Nonetheless, he asserted that, even if the Zemindars had
lacked a convincing legal “right” to their lands,
I am also convinced that, failing the claim of right of the
Zemindars, it would be necessary for the public good to
grant a right of property in the soil to them, or to persons of
their descriptions. I think it unnecessary to enter into any discussion of the grounds upon which their right appears to be
founded.122
In other words, the decisive conception of property at work in
this analysis is a functional one. The Zemindars are to be understood
not as uniquely or naturally entitled rights-holders, but as participants—even placeholders—in a functional scheme for progressive,
productive use of resources and the advancement of Indian society
and governance into modernity. The British governors of India are
constrained—perhaps by the pragmatic benefits of legal predictability
and stability, perhaps by the claim that extant rights exercise on fairness—from excessive disruptions of existing rights. The ultimate criterion of British power in Indian property reform, however, is “the
public good” of India, defined by a table of human interests regarded
as universal and authoritative.
Several features of divided sovereignty in India have emerged
from this discussion. First, the indigenous Indian government is an
imperfect sovereign, inhibited by structural impediments—notably, its
120
121
122

CORNWALLIS, supra note 102, at 74.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
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inefficient property law and the correspondingly inefficient structure
of administration—from carrying its country forward into civilization.
Second, and in contrast, Indian government is in many respects commensurable with, although inferior to, a European legal order. The
indigenous scheme of property rights is intelligible—at least from the
perspective of English reformers—on analogy with the European feudal order, in which recognizable and clear but nonetheless tangled,
despotic, and inefficient property rights contained the flawed seeds of
a modern property regime.123 The civilized sovereign’s role, therefore,
is not to erase and rewrite the legal facts of India’s present, but to
insert itself into the Indian legal order as a reformer able to spur the
unfolding of the regime’s intrinsic potential—a potential anticipated
in Europe’s own passage out of feudalism.124
What insight does this analysis give us into Chief Justice Marshall’s dismissal of the Yorke-Camden opinion? It helps to show one
half of the contrast on which the distinction rested. Indian property
rights and Indian sovereigns were not equal to those of Europe—their
“perfect independence” was not an axiom of international relations—
but they were nonetheless sufficiently cognate that legally enforceable
transactions in rights as between those sovereigns and Britons could
take place without the intervention of the British crown. To understand the full significance of this characterization, it is necessary to
examine the American side of the contrast. That means returning to
Johnson v. M’Intosh in light of the law of colonialism and the Indian
example of divided sovereignty structured by a conception of progress
which was, in turn, made operational by a theory of property regimes.
In the next Part, I argue that understanding the role of property in
filling out and making operational the civilization-based distinction
among types of sovereigns illuminates the underlying logic of the
opinion. Property theory, and the view of history in which it was em123 This is, of course, exactly the characterization James Mill gives in the passage quoted at
supra note 104. Mill understood the error in the Permanent Settlement to be the decision to side
with the feudal aristocracy rather than the yeomanry, with the concomitant failure to bring about
the increasing prosperity and autonomy of the small proprietor—just the progress that Adam
Smith envisioned in Europe, whose spirit was captured in the passage from Rothschild, supra
note 119. I discuss this dimension of Smith’s theory of evolving property rights, particularly in
respect to the right to alienate one’s own labor, in Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1251–58
(2005) [hereinafter Purdy, New Debates].
124 As Guha put it in a neat summary of the view of Philip Francis, whose plan for Permanent Settlement preceded and largely anticipated Cornwallis’s, “Francis had conceived of the
agrarian relationship in Mughal India as primarily feudal: he had wanted to replace it by a model
derived from contemporary England.” GUHA, supra note 99, at 208.
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bedded, provided a classification of the respective powers of imperfect
and perfect sovereigns.
IV. Johnson v. M’Intosh Again
Let us examine the precise terms of Chief Justice Marshall’s judgment that colonizing powers could not be bound to respect the existing property regimes of Native Americans. This takes us to the
heart of his dicta and the part of his discussion most troubling from
the point of view of today’s anticolonial sensibility and antiracist principle. Marshall, recall, opined that “those principles which Europeans
have applied to Indian title . . . may . . . find some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have
been wrested from them.”125 After explaining the customary international law requiring the conqueror to respect and maintain the property rights of the conquered, Marshall continued:
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness;
to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because
they were as brave and high spirited as they were fierce, and
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence.126
There are two distinct arguments in this passage. First, the fierce
independence of Native Americans prevented their political integration into an extended multicultural empire in which their form of life
would remain unchanged. Second, the fact that Native Americans’
“subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest” placed them in the
hunter-gatherer stage of civilization, defined by rights of personal
property and collective use—rights over those resources that are not
in personal hands. In this stage, no incentive exists for the improvement in productivity of real property, so to leave the Native American
property regime in place “was to leave the country a wilderness.” As
Blackstone had written, without the institution of private property in
land, “the world must have continued a forest,” with no incentive in
individuals for agricultural improvement.127 Blackstone maintained
that only scarcity, following the exhaustion of resources sufficient to
maintain a hunter-gather population, had spurred the recourse to
125
126
127

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
Id. at 590.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *7.
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property in land and to agriculture; “[n]ecessity begat property.”128
Without the bite of necessity, the hunter-gatherer condition could persist indefinitely, and the world would “continue a forest.”
This circumstance presented Europeans with a pair of unappetizing choices. They were, according to Chief Justice Marshall,
under the necessity either of abandoning the country, and
relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing
those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles
adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct
society.129
128 Blackstone’s elaboration of the basis for this view is one of the most famous passages of
his Commentaries:
As the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became more difficult to
find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants; and, by
constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for a future
supply or succession. It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular
method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least
promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of agriculture, by a
regular connexion and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more
permanent property in the soil, than had hitherto been received and adopted. It
was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities, without the assistance of tillage: but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another
might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art,
and labour? Had not therefore a separate property in lands, as well as moveables,
been vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men
have been mere animals of prey; which, according to some philosophers, is the
genuine state of nature. Whereas now (so graciously has providence interwoven
our duty and our happiness together) the result of this very necessity has been the
enobling of the human species, by giving it opportunities of improving it’s [sic]
rational faculties, as well as of exerting it’s [sic] natural. Necessity begat
property . . . .

Id. at *7–8.
This passage raises a very difficult question in the history and theory of the development of
property rights, one familiar from the puzzling sequence of egg and chicken. How does a people
lacking property rights in land overcome the collective-action problem of creating a new regime
to establish the rights which its members will later enjoy securely? In the context of Blackstone’s imagined history, without security sufficient to support settled agriculture, how does a
constituency first arise for rights that will undergird settled agriculture? Obviously, the existence
of a state or the intervention of a conqueror or an established foreign sovereign in another
capacity can make this problem much simpler. I shall have nothing other to observe about this
issue here. On this issue, see CAROL M. ROSE, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 25, 25–46 (1994); Katrina Miriam Wyman,
From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005)
(emphasizing the importance of political institutions in the development of property rights).
129

Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590.
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This passage partly continues the logic of the argument based on the
fierceness of Native Americans, noting again the alleged impossibility
of governing them “as a distinct society.” The characterization of Native Americans as “a people with whom it was impossible to mix,”
however, also goes to the character of their property regime and its
significance in the hierarchical civilizational timeline of imperial historiography. Native American possessory customs were incompatible
with English fee-simple property in land, with its individual rights of
use, exclusion, and alienation. The two systems could not be maintained concurrently; to follow one was to overrun and negate the
other.130 In consequence, “[t]hat law which regulates, and ought to
regulate in general, the relations between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application to a people under such circumstances.”131 Europeans therefore had to adopt “principles adapted to
the condition of a people with whom it was impossible to mix,” that is,
principles guiding the interaction of two incommensurable property
regimes and correspondingly distinct social orders and systems of government.132 The principle selected was the rule of discovery, the ex130 This assertion is not simply an intuition based on something like an analogy between
property regimes and systems of grammar or logic. It has been developed in considerable historical detail by William Cronon. See generally WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983) (explaining how European
ownership and agriculture necessarily excluded the more transient and nonexclusive land uses
characteristic of eastern Native Americans).
131 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
132 As Chief Justice Marshall put it, “[t]he resort to some new and different rule, better
adapted to the actual state of things, was unavoidable.” Id.
It is at this point that Marshall offers his peculiar history of the displacement of Native
Americans as a kind of ecological process:
As the white population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded. The
country in the immediate neighbourhood of agriculturists became unfit for them.
The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed.
The soil, . . . being no longer occupied by its original inhabitants, was parcelled out
according to the will of the sovereign power, and taken possession of by persons
who claimed immediately from the crown, or mediately, through its grantees or
deputies.
Id. at 590–91.
I think this passage is best understood as elaborating historically on the perception that the
two property regimes and their corresponding modes of productive activity cannot coexist, that
as the one expands, the other will inevitably give way—whatever the mechanisms of displacement and replacement. It is, of course, also a conveniently agent-free sketch of history, which
one could read with the impression that no European ever actually did anything to a Native
American to achieve their displacement. These two interpretations, however, are not exactly
incompatible. While the more apologetic version makes the passage plainly, even outrageously,
false as a matter of agency, that interpretation might still be right as a matter of the relationship
between the two regimes: simply by existing, the one excludes the other. Moreover, precisely
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clusive right of the sovereign to extinguish Native American
possessory rights and assign fee-simple ownership in the land. While
it may be difficult to see the solution as equitable, Marshall noted,
“[e]very rule which can be suggested will be found to be attended with
great difficulty.”133 That much would be hard to deny.
How does Marshall’s reasoning in Johnson relate to the theory of
relations between civilized and imperfect sovereigns and the division
of sovereign powers over uncivilized peoples? It follows the same
formula as Lord Cornwallis’s and John Stuart Mill’s approaches to the
problem of British government in India: the indigenous sovereign is
autonomous to the degree of its competence to promote and secure
progress.134 So far as it is incapable of serving that role, it may be
supplanted by another sovereign to vindicate the values of civilization.
In both the Indian and the American cases, the impediment to progress is in substantial part a property system that keeps the society at a
“pre-modern” stage of development: in India, feudalism characterized
by personal dependence and arbitrary government; in America, a
seminomadic hunter-gatherer condition that produces no wealth and
from which no institutions of complex government are likely to
emerge (that is, according to the then-dominant theory of progress).
The difference in the European responses—incorporating the colonial
power into the local structure as an agent of reform (as well, of course,
as exploitation) versus colonizing the country and displacing the local
population—seemed to Marshall to reflect a difference in the range of
feasible options. Indian property and governance structures had
seemed to Cornwallis to be sufficiently cognate to their European
analogues to be susceptible to incremental reform. Native American
property and governance seemed to Marshall to be categorically incompatible with Europe’s institutions and resistant to internal reform,
and so to present the tragic choice he described: expropriate or leave.
To leave was to abandon the cause of progress; expropriation, by contrast, made the colonial sovereign the instrument of progress. Marshall’s reasoning thus implemented the same customary principle that
guided the British theory of rule in India in the Permanent Settlement
and beyond. The relative authority of perfect and imperfect soverbecause of its dynamic efficiency, the European regime has an expansionist logic: any individual
participant has incentive to claim new tracts of land for his individual benefit, but with the inevitable consequence of bringing that tract under the terms of the regime.
133

Id. at 591.

See supra note 91 and accompanying text (regarding Mill); supra Part III.B (regarding
Cornwallis).
134
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eigns is ordered by their respective competence to promote and secure progress. In turn, property regimes both indicate the society’s
level of progress and are the instrument of further progress. To understand the Native American property regime was to see why it had
to be broken and what should replace it.
Conclusion: A Little More Irony
Johnson v. M’Intosh is an unsettling case. As I have argued,
Chief Justice Marshall’s purely legal logic is cryptic and unsatisfactory.
Reading it carefully can lead one to doubt the integrity of legal reasoning, or at least the autonomy of legal reasoning. This in itself is no
big surprise; it is conventional nowadays to understand property law
in terms of the public policy or social ends that it secures.135 Nor is
this anything new: theorists have understood property regimes in this
manner as long as they have been thinking about them.136
What obviously distinguishes Johnson is the nature of the policy
that motivates it: expropriation of an inhabited continent at the cost—
even then becoming increasingly clear—of extinguishing a way of life
and most of the people who inhabited it.137 Without intending any
insensitivity to the horror of that extermination, I would venture to
say that this is not much of a surprise, either.138 The bloodiness and
135 The influence of economic analysis on legal scholarship has been so powerful in recent
decades that an enormous amount of work on the dynamics of property regimes has addressed
the economic efficiency secured by the coordinated pursuit of respective self-interest. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32–34 (6th ed. 2003); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320–21 (1993) (defining the “efficiency thesis” as the
theory that “land rules within a close-knit group evolve so as to minimize its members’ costs”).
One of the canonical articles expressing this view is R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Also significant here are the costs of creating and enforcing property
rights, which may be greater than the gains the rights make possible. The canonical treatment of
this issue in modern legal scholarship is Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347.
136 See ARISTOTLE, Review of Ideal States, in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 39, 49 (Ernest
Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (“[I]t is a difficult business for men to live together and
to be partners in any form of human activity, but it is specially difficult to do so when property is
involved. . . . When everyone has his own separate sphere of interest, there will not be the same
ground for quarrels; and the amount of interest will increase, because each man will feel that he
is applying himself to what is his own.”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *4–10 (tracing the
historical development of property rights); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
314–16 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (discussing the comparative societal benefit of European and Native American property regimes).
137 This is very much Joseph Singer’s concern in his discussion of the case. See generally
Singer, supra note 47 (connecting the logic and result of Johnson to a long history of judicial
apology for displacement and expropriation of Native Americans).
138 For a few instances of the savagery of the American extermination of the continent’s
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racism of American history are pervasive and, after many decades of
neglect, increasingly well documented and widely recognized. Observing that a major case on the legitimacy of European claims to
North America is implicated in these shameful facts may be a reminder of our reasons for dismay, but it is not a revelation. Contemporary Americans are accustomed to acknowledging this history, at
least nominally, and marking with relief the difference between the
colonial settlers’ attitudes and ours.
In examining the reasoning of Johnson, I have done my best to
hold at bay my own moral attitudes toward the historical period it
describes and helped shape.139 Instead, I have tried to enter into the
views of social order and progress that informed the contemporary
jurisprudential view of the two issues that intersect in Johnson: the
relationship between “civilized” and “uncivilized” peoples and the nature and purposes of property regimes. In the presuppositions of the
opinion, as in much of the thought of the period, lay a theory of hierarchy among nations and their governments, in which advanced nations might—even must—supplant the power of backward,
“imperfect” sovereigns. Central to the powers and duties of advanced
countries was remaking the property regimes of subordinate peoples
to spur economic development and produce the stability necessary to
nonarbitrary government. Doing less, it seemed to adherents of this
perspective, would mean neglecting the duties of progress, leaving India under despotism and North America an undeveloped
“wilderness.”
In presenting this rationale for imperial government generally,
and for Johnson’s law of expropriation in particular, I have hoped to
highlight a quality I find even more unsettling than the hard-to-miss
racism and genocidal implications of the opinion: the essential familiarity of its central logic. The theory that Euro-American property regimes spurred economic and political progress and that progress
justified the extension of such property regimes did not depend on
racism, that is, on a belief about the inherent qualities of various
Native American population, see WILENTZ, supra note 38, at 152 (noting the destruction of
entire villages and the opening and emptying of Native American graves); id. at 171–72 (discussing the “lopsided bloodbath[s]” which occurred under Andrew Jackson’s command). These are
the kinds of atrocities against entire populations that we take today as indicia of ethnic cleansing
and genocide, and that is just what they were.
139 Those attitudes are conventional liberal ones. Depending on my state of mind, I sometimes shudder in reading Chief Justice Marshall’s sanguine recounting of the inevitability of the
continent’s clearing and the westward movement of white settlers. I assume, though, that my
moral attitudes, precisely because they are so conventional, add little to this discussion.
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human groups. It depended, rather, on a functional account of the
incentives to dynamic efficiency that private property provided and
the limits on arbitrary government that it promoted. The hierarchy of
civilizational stages that Smith and Blackstone expressed and which, I
have argued, informed Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning, is baroque,
but aside from its sweeping generalizations about history and societies, its guiding principles remain the cornerstones of reasoning about
property law.140 If contemporary scholars, lawyers, and legislators did
not believe that property regimes should be judged in good part by
how well they promote economic efficiency and secure ordered political liberty, we would be at a loss to talk about them at all.141
Yet Marshall’s opinion, which depends essentially on these rationales, may strike today’s reader—it does strike me—as morally blind
to the human costs of its reasoning. That blindness does not depend
mainly on attitudes we have repudiated in our subsequent enlightenment. It rests more substantially on values we still embrace, albeit in
different programmatic versions, and to which we lack compelling alternatives. This is at least a reason to wonder whether the justifications we give for our own property systems, and for that matter, the
other parts of our legal systems, might not support forms of moral
blindness in us.
I do not mean to draw any grand, speculative conclusion from
this point; only to urge reading Marshall’s opinion as revealing something not just about his time and perspective, but about the possible
limits and hazards of a perspective we substantially share. If Marshall’s sanguine reasoning disappoints and angers us, we might apply
some of that emotional energy to our own ways of thinking. I urge
this critical examination not on the assumption that our ideas must be
bad and wrong, but in the recognition that legal judgments are complex and sometimes tragic in their results, and that complacency in
140 For discussions of the economic functions of property regimes, see supra note 135; see
also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 39–66 (2001) (outlining the efficiency effects of legally
designating the productive aspects of resources as the objects of fungible and universally transferable right-claims). For contemporary discussions of the capacity of property regimes to promote and secure political freedom, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1998) (describing how “the protection of property ownership was an integral part of the American effort to fashion constitutional limits on governmental authority”); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM xii (1999)
(arguing that property is a necessary prerequisite for political liberty).
141 I do not write from outside these perspectives; quite the contrary. See, e.g., Purdy, New
Debates, supra note 123 (arguing for a freedom-promoting approach to property regimes that
takes into account economic efficiency as a promoter of substantive human freedom).
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them always gives encouragement to moral blindness. In that way, we
might manage to be more ironic in our view of law than Marshall was,
more skeptical, more self-questioning, less inclined to conclude that
we have resolved matters to everyone’s satisfaction and best interest.
That would be an ironic benefit of a subtle, complex, and elusive opinion, whose evasions do not quite manage to wipe the blood from its
hands.

